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BOOK REVIEWS
THE PHIosoPHY op LAw op Jmims WiLso.. By William F. Obering, S.J., Ph.D.
Washington, D. C.: The American Catholic Philosophical Association. 1933. pp.

275.
Of all the savants who have graced the bench of the United States Supreme
Court, two stand out as scholars whose genius was recognized even by their own
contemporaries. They are James Wilson and Oliver Wendell Holmes. To Wilson's
lectures on law in the College of Philadelphia, the world of fashion and letters, even
including the first President of the United States, came in admiring throngs. Equally
distinguished audiences waited upon Holmes. whenever he mounted the rostrum.
Perhaps, the popularity of these philosophers was due in some measure to the fact
that their words and teachings struck responsive echoes in the breasts of their
hearers. Wilson, the intellectualist, the theist, the devotee of natural law, voiced
the old fashioned morals and thorough scholarship, characteristic of his generation.
Other legal scholars of his day, Madison and Hamilton, marched identical pathways
of thought. Holmes, the experimentalist, the pragmatist, the iconoclast, articulated
the unanchored skepticism and vague humanism of our modem day. The ranhs of
our present army of legal scholars are filled with men in the same mental uniform.
The fact that Holmes and not Wilson represents the ideals of our own age is distressing indeed, but the very publication of the present monograph of Dr. Obering in
appreciation of the work of the almost forgotten Wilson is an omen that brighter
times are coming. How long it will be before the generality of lavyers and teachers
of law return to the sanity and clarity of a philosophy like Wilson's is not to be estimated. But the day will come.
Dr. Obering's present volume points out that James Wilson, unlike the teachers
of our time was not a liberal, he was a partisan. He was a partisan of the sound way
of thinking about legal institutions and he did not hesitate to condemn the errors
of philosophies adverse to his own. Although he was an eclectic in assembling his
materials and illustrations, he did not permit his students to infer that any philosophy
of law was worthy of the same respect as any other. He thought too clearly not to
see that contradictory propositions could not be equally true. He believed that ultimate truth and untruth could be determined. In this regard he comes into conflict
with the many modernists who feed their students a spoonful of this and a bite of
that and leave the selection of a final diet to the digestive whims of the pupil.
Wilson is also indicated to be a teacher particularly well equipped to instruct in
the philosophy of law. His writings show a familiarity with human psychology,
with natural theology and with political philosophy. An understanding of these studies
is necessary if one is to understand man, the subject, God, the final source, and the
state, the immediate arbiter of law. Too many of our modem law teachers lack
this knowledge. Forced by the complexity of modem legal problems, to attempt the
formulation of a guiding philosophy they have been deprived of this necessary preliminary foundation by the accident of having studied under positivist professors
who considered a philosophical investigation of the nature of man or of God either
too insignificant or too dangerous for open discussion in a non-sectarian university.
Dr. Obering applauds Wilson as a teacher of clarity. No other writer in the history
of American law has so adequately traced the thread of scholasticism which is woven
into the fabric of American institutions nor so convincingly set forth the philosophy
of natural law. Generally modem American teachers lost in the mazes of Kantianism
and experimentalism, are not equipped to understand and explain with any plausibility
this fundamental philosophy of American legal institutions.
Dr. Obering's monograph will then be found to be most valuable to those non-

FORDHAM LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 7

scholastic law teachers who would secure some accurate idea of the scholastic doctrine of natural law. Indeed, he has added to Wilson's theses. Where Wilson has but
sketchily explained the positions of the great teachers of scholasticism, Dr. Obering
from his wide knowledge has been able to point out the inadequacy. For example,
with reference to Wilson's discussion of the state as a natural institution, Dr. Obering
rightly insists that civil authority is not merely the aggregate of the powers and rights
previously possessed by individuals before their entrance into the social union. This
was Wilson's understanding of the nature of civil authority. The present volume will
also throw valuable light upon the problem of those interested in the philosophical
justification of our democratic institutions as opposed to the politics of arbitrary
dictatorship. Wilson gives the traditional, but unfortunately little known arguments
for democracy, based on the psychological doctrine of the essential equality of men.
But for the ordinary reader the most impressive part of Wilson's work will be the
force of his establishment of natural law itself, which he does according to familiar
lines, but with sweeping literary power. He demonstrates the existence of natural
law, as all scholastics do, by pointing to the existence of an All Wise Creator of Man
and His assignment of an intrinsic end which man must realize in this life. The
plan of free action whereby this end is to be realized is obligatory and is natural
law.

Here then is a valuable monograph. It comes at a time when a new interest in
natural law is beginning to spread to America from the lecture halls of the continent.
It will not be welcomed by the pseudo-scientist nor flippant skeptic absorbed in relating child psychology and folklore to our legal institutions. But there are those who
will appreciate it, scholastic and non-scholastic.
WLIAm R. WHITE, JR.t

By William T. Fryer. St. Paul: West Pub.
lishing Co. 1938. pp. xxxii, 1184. $5.00.

READINGS ON PERSONAL PROPERTY.

In recent years the case system has been under attack along many fronts. Jerome
Frank argues for a virtual abandonment of the technique of case instruction and the
substitution of clinical lawyer-schools wherein books would play a minor part.' Realists are insisting that law school case books should include extra-legal material from
the social sciences and other sources outside of the law.2 Just how far the classical
case book of the Langdell era will be modified remains in doubt. Harvard Law
School has revised its law curriculum and rearranged its courses,3 but the new case
books4 follow the orthodox pattern and consist mainly of cases, statutes and law
text material. As Scott and Simpson express it, "Cases are the backbone

. . .

of

any course in the common-law tradition".5
Another experiment in law school books is noted with the arrival of Professor Fryer's
Readings on PersonalProperty. He has prepared what he calls a "source book". The
t

Lecturer in Law, Fordham University, School of Law.

1. Frank, Why Not a Clinical Lawyer-School? (1933) 81 U. or PA. L. REv. 907.
2. Cook, Scientific Method and the Law (1927) 13 A. B. A. J. 303; Patterson, Can
Law Be Scientific? (1930) 25 Ii.. L. REv. 121.
3. Simpson, The New Curriculum of the Harvard Law School (1938) 51 HAtav. L. Rv.
965.
4. See WARREN, CAszs ON PROPERTY (2d ed. 1938); ScoTT AND SIUPSON, CASES AND
OTEaR MATERIALS ON Juicmai Rnm.rzrns (1938).

5. Note 4 supra at viii.
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contents of his book may be divided into three parts: (1) recent decisions, notes and
comments prepared mainly by student editors of the various law reviews; (2) leading
articles appearing in the same journals; and (3) a scattering of cases out of the reports. 6
It thus appears that the "source book" is largely limited to materials obtained
from legal periodicals. One wonders whether such a limitation is wise or necessary.
Would not excerpts from leading texts on personal property law balance the volume
and provide a broader foundation? For example: sections from Pollock and Wright,
Williams, Goodeve, Schouler and many others. Such additional materials might do
much to acquaint the student not only with the "uncertainties in the rules" but
also with the presence of stabilizing principles and standards long implanted in the
common law tradition.
Fryer intends his book to be used principally for the purpose of collateral reading
in connection with the study of cases in the orthodox case books. In order to facilitate
such use he has somewhat reluctantly adhered to the orthodox classification of topics
although he concedes that it might have been desirable to add non-legal material
showing the history and function of property.8 This brings us to the question
whether it would have been more desirable or advantageous to have used the functional approach in the development of his source book on personal property. Having
in mind that such reading will be generally undertaken by the student beginning his
law course and that the subject matter involves property law, it may be suggested
that attempts to "functionalize" the law might well be postponed, if used at all, to
other courses in the second or third year of the student's law course. Again, the
flexibility of property law, while concededly present, is certainly not so pronounced
as in some of the other subjects in the law school curriculum. It strikes the revicver
that although Professor Fryer followed the orthodox treatment from necessity rather
than from choice, the approach promises to increase the value of the book to law
teacher and law student.
It seems to be unquestionable that Readings on Personal Property will be relied
upon to a considerable extent by the law student to supplement and to round out the
information and discussion centering in the classroom. One of the great advantages
of such a source book is that it may be readily keyed to the case books on the same
subject and vast areas of analogous cases considered by the law student.
Professor Fryer begins with an introduction which covers various concepts of
personal property. Herein he treats of such diverse topics as property rights in a
dead body, the right of privacy, companionship of the spouses, rights in an unpatented invention, property in a business plan, etc. At this point it may be noted
that he has introduced the student to the outside boundaries of personal property law
and has avoided a restrictive approach which would limit personal property to the
subdivisions of chattels and choses in action. It is noteworthy that he has not, so
far as the reviewer can discover, set down any readings in the law of chattels real,
an omission which may have been due to the scarcity of material in the law reviews
on this hybrid type of personal property.
Perhaps a preliminary survey of the concept of property in general might have
been included since the student, entering upon a study of property law for the first
time, does so by way of the beginning course of personal property. What is the
nature of property as an institution? Is it a natural right or a creation of positive
law? The reviewer9 has found that such an approach through the writings of Kent,
Cardozo, Pound and others serves two purposes: It brings back materials covered
6. Professor Fryer has included about twelve cases in the course of 11C0 pages of text.
7. Preface, v.
8. Preface, v-vi.
9. Kmay,CAsEs oi-x PERsoAL ProPE:RTY (1932) 1-18.
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during college courses in economics, philosophy, sociology and industrial problems,
thereby bridging the gap between college and law school. Moreover it enables the
student to obtain a broad view of property in general before turning to the refinements of the law of personal property.
Following the introductory chapter, on the concepts of personal property, the
author offers a collection of materialsLOon the fundamental topic of possession which
"still plays a great part in our law".
Fryer's chapter on Possession offers a good
proving-ground to test out the utility and value of his source book. It seems to the
reviewer that the main advantage will be its broadening influence. The reading of
articles by Arnold," Shartel, 12 Goodhart' 3 and others will supplement the basic, and
necessarily limited, consideration of possession in the case books and in the class
discussion. It does not suffice to say that these articles are already available in the
law reviews and may be cited to the students; they are now packaged in more accessible form and are apt to be more widely read.
Professor Fryer has collected more than thirty leading articles covering the
different subdivisions of the law of personal property and his selection of essays is
an excellent one. His arrangement of material into "border-type", "conventionaltype" and "special-type" cases is unique and helpful to the reader. An excellent and
complete index makes his materials more accessible. It is believed that Readings on
Personal Property will prove to be popular with teacher and student and will be a
valuable addition to the law books on that subject.
WALTER B. KENNEDYI

OTHER MATERIALS ON ADMINISTRATIVE LAW.
By Robert Adam Maurer.
New York: The Lawyers Co-operative Publishing Company. 1937. Pp. 589. $6.00.

CASES AND

This book contains an excellent selection of cases dealing with problems in Administrative Law. The materials used in addition to the cases are most helpful and this
is especially true because of the wealth of references to matter in legal periodicals.
This book particularly lends itself to a single semester course.
It is interesting to compare the differences in approach and resulting divergence
in general and detailed treatment appearing in contemporary casebooks dealing
with this subject. In general, they haven't departed a great deal from the illuminating straight lines driven through a chaotic mass by Professor Freund in 1911. The
constitutional approach seems ever to be present. Whether it is patent as in Frankfurter and Davison (Legislative Power; Judicial Power; Executive Power) or whether
the approach is ostensibly functional as in Professor Sear's late work on the subject,
there is inherently a constitutional treatment. This is desirable and to some extent
unavoidable. As Professor Freund so soundly wrote, "Administrative Law continues
to be treated as law controlling the administration and not as law produced by the
administration." The control referred to is a constitutional one and the approach
and treatment should be constitutional. Professor Maurer uses the conceptual, constitutional approach.
The table of contents is not topically detailed. He has left analysis to the student
in the first instance. But his alignment of cases when comprehended permits of an
orderly statement of principles if the order of the cases is followed.
WARREN, CASES
11. P. 55.
12. P. 130.
13. P. 72.
10.

ON PROPERTY

(2d ed.

1938)

Preface vi.

t" Professor of Law, Fordham University, School of Law.
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In Chapter I, the author deals with "Development in Administrative Law". In this
brief chapter he borrows from or refers to MIontesquieu, Dicey. Hewart, the Sankey
Report, and the Report of the Special Committee on Administrative Law of the
American Bar Association (1934). The matter is instructive and provocative of
student interest. The second chapter is entitled "Grants of Administrative Discretion"; the third chapter is entitled "Delegation of Legislative Power". The
distinction is that Chapter II deals with propriety of granting more or less uncontrolled discretion to decide, whereas Chapter III concerns itself with the difference
between administrative legislation and legislative administration. Generally the same
question is presented: Is there a sufficient standard set up to prevent law.maldng
by the agency? Yet the division is essential because in the one chapter, the authority
is to decide a controversy, whereas in the other, power is given to make rules to
control future controversies. The authors selection of cases in these chapters showing the province of the federal courts as distinguished from that of the state courts
is excellent. The cases and materials in the subsequent chapters on administrative
adjudication and finality are well chosen. Probably the addition of more state
court material would have increased the value of the work, but there is greater
similarity between the federal position and the state position in the field of administrative adjudication than there is in the field of administrative legislation. "Due
process" is the test in state and nation.
Professor Maurer has included a chapter on the writs which are the vehicles
between the agency and the court. In view of the fact that some statutes creating
administrative tribunals contain no provision for appeal, material dealing with certiorari, mandamus, prohibition, injunction, and habeas corpus would seem to be
essential The location of this chapter in the book is wise. It follows the matter
dealing with the fundamental precepts. It is well to present the substantive before
the adjective. True, the writs are helpful substantively, but their assistance would
seem more complementary than rudimentary. The substantive element in the writs
may to some extent review concepts gained in the previous chapters.
EUGENE

OLD u oN--TALEs, TRhns A- D TRALs. By James Wickersham.
D.C.: Washington Law Book Co. 1938. pp. 500. $5.00.

3.

KEELEt

Washington,

To lawyers with a mind for new frontiers, the experiences of Judge Wickersham
in Alaska may prove interesting and enlightening. The author of "Old Yukon"
was appointed United States District Court Judge for the Territory of Alaska by
President McKinley in 1900. In 1908 he entered the private practice of law in
Juneau and for fourteen years served as Delegate to Congress from Alaska. Old
Yukon is an intimate relation of his personal, judicial and political experiences.
The Judge was particularly gifted for the task of establishing American jurisprudence along the rough and treacherous Alaskan trails. He traveled his circuit
by dog team, Indian canoe, horseback and at navigable points enjoyed the comforts
of the early Alaskan steamers. With his pack, including the Alaskan Code and
blank legal forms, "diamond-hitched" to his dog sled, he traveled from cabin to
cabin along hard cold trails holding court wherever the need arose. He was always
well received by the varied classes of people who crossed his trail from reckless
bar maids to charitable Catholic nuns serving the sick and schooling the children,
from murderous outlaws to Christian missionaries. The big mining companies
welcomed his presence and the protection of the American court. The small prost Associate Professor Law, Fordham University, School of Law.
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pectors and gold miners whose claims were constantly in dispute sought his refuge
for the establishment of their claims and the personal protection afforded by the
enforcement of the laws against the sale of intoxicants to the Indians. The Indians
too came to the "White Father" for redress of grievances and tested his resourcefulness from the start of his judicial career. Except for the ordinary hardships of life
in the wilds of the northwest, the author discharged his judicial duties with comparative ease, because he enjoyed every day of his work, the adventure of life in
Alaska, and the opportunity afforded him in the new territory to broaden his
knowledge.
Federal politics reached out to the Territory and threatened his successful career.
This phase of the author's experience as likewise his fight with powerful American
interests in the Territory is treated in detail. Such must be the common experience
of lawyers in territorial practice and to those men this book should be interesting.
Fully half the book is a relation of the author's personal experiences in quest of
knowledge of the Alaskan Territory, its history, its people, its geology and its
languages. On these adventures enjoyed between terms of court or while awaiting
the preparation of cases for trial, the Judge met the Jesuit Fathers who were
actively engaged in common quests even at that early date. They exchanged valuable notes and information which are related in detail by the author.
• The lure of Alaska is in the narrative. While the gold rush days are over, the
looming importance of the Territory of Alaska in the world of tomorrow when
globe circling air liners may transform it into a center of world commerce, is but
a suggestion of the importance of the work of the pioneer judges, lawyers and
missionaries who have been and are continuing to establish Christian and American
law in this present outpost of American civilization. To forward looking readers this
book should be of interest and value.
ARTHUR J. O'DrAf

ITALY AT THE PEACE CONFERENCE.

University Press.

1938.

By Rene Albrecht-Carrie.

pp. 575.

New York: Columbia

$5.25.

Of little technical value to lawyers, this volume is nevertheless important as a
thorough survey of the peculiar problems which arose from the peculiar position of
Italy. Bargained and bargaining into war entrance on the side of the allies, unable
to bring much of worth to the cause save the virtue of not being embarrassingly on
the other side, Italy approached the peace conference to see what she could get, and
found her allies already in antagonism to her aims, and the United States firmly,
established on general principles which clashed with Italian wishes. The details of
the shifting arguments and tense situations are well and fully exemplified. The
entire work shows how little absolute principle, and indeed how little previous understandings, may actually weigh in the balance in more advanced situations. It is an
instance of what is often disparagingly termed "power politics" and shows how in
the international field what might be termed "law" is of small actual determining
weight beside interests.
ELBRIDGE COLBYt

t

Member of the New Jersey Bar.

t Major, Infantry, U. S. Army.

